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Re: Forum gossip thread by DKG

I pissed the damn bed again...

Started by Angry White Male, May 30, 2017, 10:51:10 PM

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Anonymous

Quote from: "Angry White Male"Yup, it's true.



I wanted to spend the evening drinking a few brews, and listen to Randy and the Rainbows, but now I wash sheets, and wait for the vinegar to dry.



You see, I believe vinegar neutralizes the piss, so I dumped a liter of Heinz Vinegar on the piss.  THAT should solve that problem!



Problem is, it will take some time for the vinegar to completely dry.  So now I can sit here listening to Denise, Denise, drinking a few brews, while the smell of vinegar is still wafting through the condo...



Denise, Denise, I'm so in love with you!   :sm(38):  :sm(38):  :sm(38):

And you wonder why you can't get laid. You are going to end up like old Joe when you're sixty.

Renee

Quote from: "Berry Sweet"
Quote from: "Renee"
Quote from: "Berry Sweet"Maybe its time to put a protective plastic covering on the bed (the couch as well).


Maybe a liquid sensing alarm as well?.... :laugh3:


Those are available for bed wetters!  Mel would be passed out thru the alarm...


Yeah, that's a problem. The alarm will probably just annoy his neighbors on the other side of the wall.



Maybe there's a bed wetter alarm that gives an electric shock?....  ac_umm
\"A man\'s rights rest in three boxes. The ballot-box, the jury-box and the cartridge-box.\"

Frederick Douglass, November 15, 1867.


GORDY GAMBINO

Right Blurts I gothe  hold so Shunt him cunt him right in th e caboose.
RW = ANAL SIZE WHORE

Anonymous

Quote from: "GORDY GAMBINO"Right Blurts I gothe  hold so Shunt him cunt him right in th e caboose.

Hello GORDY.

 ac_hithere

Anonymous

Quote from: "Blurt"


The Lac Mégantic fiasco showed just how greedy and unprincipled many railway companies are.



I lived in Sherbrooke, QC, for a couple of years and there's a railway bisecting the city right at the heart of the downtown core along which dangerous materials and goods are ferried. I think it's just an accident waiting to happen.

Blurt, you ignorant fool, Lac Megantic was strictly the fault of engineer Thomas Harding who broke CROR rule 112 by not applying sufficient handbrakes for the length of the train. The manager of train operations and a rail traffic controller were also charged(though I don't understand why when it's so clear one employee was responsible).

 

As a result of one white employee's laziness by cutting corners and breaking rules, 47 people are dead and a small short line railway is out of business and people have lost their jobs.  Yes, there was greed and unprincipled behaviour, but it was not this little short line's fault that they had an unethical employee working for them.



As for
QuoteI think it's just an accident waiting to happen
that just shows you don't think and make stupid assumptions without any  understanding of civil engineering as it applies to railways. My daddy was a civil engineer for China's state-owned railway and a division engineer for CN on the Edson sub. I happen to know a wee bit more than you about railway safety rules regulations and construction.



The St Lawrence and Atlantic which you showed in that vid is a short line railway that acts as contractor for CN. In that vid, they were switching out a transfer(small cut of cars) for CN, with a ten mile an hour speed restriction. Even if one car jumped the fucking tracks, only one axle would derail before the switcher came to a complete halt. It has neither the weight nor the speed for any cars to hit the ground.



I am tired of having to educate imbeciles like you who don't know a fucking spring frog from a hot box detector, but think they are experts.

Anonymous

I know the difference between the kinds of frogs. And I have been over thousands of hot box detectors. Do I win a prize?



I got less than seven years until I retire and it can't come soon enough for me. I hate all these cumbersome rules. And everytime some slacker like that Harding guy who was fired from CN decides the rules don't apply to him there are serious consequences. For the people of Lac Megantic it was like a holocaust. For me, it means adding more rules and making my job more stressful. I don't know what good adding more rules does when previous rules are not being followed by a few people.

Blurt

Sorry to disappoint you, Shen.



Here are some excerpts from the official TSB report that followed the investigation of the Lac Mégantic accident. I've also included a link to the
">summary report for your viewing pleasure and entertainment.



It's super easy (especially for a company shill) to blame the actions of a lone worker for a tragedy, but things are a little bit more complicated than you suggest, and MMA must certainly shoulder a goodly portion of the blame, m'kay?



In October 2012, eight months before this accident, the lead locomotive was sent to MMA's repair shop following an engine failure. Given the significant time and cost of a standard repair, and the pressure to return the locomotive to service, the engine was repaired with an epoxy-like material that lacked the required strength and durability. This material failed in service, leading to engine surges and excessive black and white smoke. Eventually, oil began to accumulate in the body of the turbocharger, where it overheated and caught fire on the night of the accident.



---



That night, the engineer carried out the hand brake effectiveness test with the locomotive air brakes still applied. As a result, the test did not identify that an insufficient amount of hand brake force had been applied to secure the train.



---



All 72 tanks cars were Class 111, manufactured between 1980 and 2012. Although they met requirements in effect at the time, they were built to an older standard, and they lacked enhancements such as a jacket, a full head shield, and thermal protection.



---



An organization with a strong safety culture is generally proactive when it comes to addressing safety issues. MMA was generally reactive. There were also significant gaps between the company's operating instructions and how work was done day to day. This and other signs in MMA's operations were indicative of a weak safety culture—one that contributed to the continuation of unsafe conditions and unsafe practices, and significantly compromised the company's ability to manage risk.



When the investigation looked carefully at MMA's operations, it found that employee training, testing, and supervision were not sufficient, particularly when it came to the operation of hand brakes and the securement of trains. Although MMA had some safety processes in place and had developed a safety management system in 2002, the company did not begin to implement this safety management system until 2010—and by 2013, it was still not functioning effectively.



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For several years, Transport Canada's regional office in Quebec had identified MMA as a company with an elevated level of risk that required more frequent inspections. Although MMA normally took corrective action once problems were identified, it was not uncommon for the same problems to reappear during subsequent inspections. These problems included issues with train securement, training, and track conditions. Transport Canada's regional office in Quebec, however, did not always follow up to ensure that these recurring problems were effectively analyzed and that the underlying conditions were fixed.



In addition, although MMA had developed a safety management system in 2002, Transport Canada's regional office in Quebec did not audit it until 2010—even though this is Transport Canada's responsibility, and despite clear indications (via inspections) that the company's safety management system was not effective. Transport Canada Headquarters in Ottawa, meanwhile, did not effectively monitor the Region's activities. As a result, it was not aware of any weaknesses in oversight of regional railways in Quebec, and it did not intervene.



---



After looking at the circumstances that night, the investigation was not able to conclude that having another crew member would have prevented the accident.



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The petroleum crude oil in the tank cars was more volatile than described on the shipping documents. If petroleum crude oil is not tested systematically and frequently, there is a risk of it being improperly classified. The movement of these improperly classified goods increases the risk to people, property, and the environment.



---



[size=150]Findings[/size]



Investigations conducted by the TSB are complex—an accident is never caused by just one factor. This report identifies 18 distinct causes and contributing factors, many of them influencing one another.
Aimin\' to misbehave.

Anonymous

Blurt, I am afraid Shen Li was right. The findings of that report are posted in station house in Logan yard.



An engine failure has no bearing on the train rolling from a stopped position.


QuoteThat night, the engineer carried out the hand brake effectiveness test with the locomotive air brakes still applied. As a result, the test did not identify that an insufficient amount of hand brake force had been applied to secure the train.

You can't do a proper tug test with the air brakes applied, so this means nothing.


QuoteAll 72 tanks cars were Class 111, manufactured between 1980 and 2012. Although they met requirements in effect at the time, they were built to an older standard, and they lacked enhancements such as a jacket, a full head shield, and thermal protection

The single hulled DOT 111 were the standard until recently.


QuoteAlthough MMA had some safety processes in place and had developed a safety management system in 2002, the company did not begin to implement this safety management system until 2010—and by 2013, it was still not functioning effectively.

I don't understand this at all. MMA was subject to the rules of CROR as they apply to short line operators. The engineer knew the rules or he would not have been qualified in the hog head's chair. As an engineer, this is drilled into my brain.


QuoteTransport Canada's regional office in Quebec had identified MMA as a company with an elevated level of risk

Do you know what this means? A roadmaster sent in a report to Transport Canada about joints on 100 pound rail with missing bolts. Or broken rails with slow orders that must also be sent to Transport Canada. These are also sent to section crews or contractors who do the repairs.


QuoteTransport Canada Headquarters in Ottawa, meanwhile, did not effectively monitor the Region's activities

Transport Canada doesn't monitor trains or tracks(which causes most derailments). They come out, see if we are wearing our vests and we have our paperwork. For track maintenance, they get all their information from the roadmasters. They are completely useless if you expect them to keep you safe.


Quotethe investigation was not able to conclude that having another crew member would have prevented the accident.

I disagree with this. Had a conductor been with the hog head, he might have been less likely to cut corners when applying handbrakes. Besides, it's the conductor's job on a two man operation.


QuoteThe petroleum crude oil in the tank cars was more volatile than described on the shipping documents.

We have different levels of dangerous goods we haul. I can tell as soon as I see a car what level of risk it poses without even looking at the conductor's paperwork on the consist.



an accident is never caused by just one factor

Wrong, it's almost always caused by one factor. We had two trains derail due to washouts recently. The local roadmaster did not put out slow order GBO's to train crews over the affected areas and we lost millions of dollars worth of equipment and potash because one person did not do their job.



From reading this, I wonder if the people who wrote it know anything about railway operations.

Anonymous

Conclusion, an insufficient number of handbrakes were applied to hold a train that length on such a grade. One irresponsible person has the blood of forty seven people on his hands.



On 1.2 per cent grade and with the size of train he had, he should have had 34 hand brakes applied. He really cut corners.

Angry White Male

I'm used to commercial vehicle airbrakes...  I'd love to comment on train airbrakes, but the systems may be slightly different...

Angry White Male

#55
.

Anonymous

Quote from: "Angry White Male"I'm used to commercial vehicle airbrakes...  I'd love to comment on train airbrakes, but the systems may be slightly different...

If I go into emergency, it takes me an hour to get my air back up.

Angry White Male

It's just a single air line that runs to the cars, right?

Angry White Male

I should Google exactly how train air brakes work...  It may be very similar as to how transport trucks decades ago were set up...  Just one line.  No failsafe.



Every truck now has two lines, which are required for a failsafe system to be failsafe, even though they aren't technically failsafe either, but just better than what was before..

Angry White Male

#59
I Googled it.  Trains do operate on a different system...  One line, but with failsafe built into that design.  Westinghouse invented this design.



They say it's failsafe, but air pressure is required to apply the brakes under all circumstances.  That's why transport trucks eventually went with the system that they use now...  Zero air pressure should hold the brake tightly against the drum, provided things are adjusted correctly.